

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 124475

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA, BONN,
CAPE TOWN, KHARTOUM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, OTTAWA, PARIS, PRETORIA,
USUN NEW YORK FROM LONDON MAY 26:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 08776

CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XJ, SU, LY, UR, US

SUBJECT: YOUNG AND SUDANESE FONMIN KHALID DISCUSS

LIBYA AND THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFRICA

1. AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND HIS STAFF MET FOR AN HOUR
MAY 24 IN KHARTOUM WITH SUDANESE FONMIN KHALID AND
MINSTATE DENG PRIOR TO THE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT

NIMEIRI (SEPTTEL). AFTER A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF
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SUDAN'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL FOR CONTRI-
BUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY, KHALID RAISED SUDAN'S
TROUBLES WITH LIBYA AS AN EXAMPLE OF TENSIONS ENGENDERED
BY THE SOLID STRENGTH DEVELOPING WITHIN THE SUDAN.
SUDAN'S FOCUS INTERNALLY SINCE NIMEIRI CAME TO POWER HAS
UNIFIED THE COUNTRY AND LAUNCHED THE DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY. NOW SUDAN CAN AFFORD TO LOOK TO EXTERNAL

AFFAIRS.

2. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS QUADDAFY WHO MUST BE MENTALLY DISTURBED WITH A SPLIT PERSONALITY. YOUNG AND KHALID AGREED THAT QUADDAFY'S NOTION OF PAN-AFRICANISM IS UNLIKE NKRUMAH'S; IT SPRINGS FROM A DESIRE FOR CONQUEST. QUADDAFY'S DRIVE IS ALSO FUELED IDEOLOGICALLY BY THE SOVIET UNION. AMBASSADOR YOUNG SAID, HOWEVER, HE HOPED WE COULD AVOID MAKING THE MISTAKE WE ALL MADE WITH AMIN. NO ONE PAID ANY ATTENTION TO HIM UNTIL HE SLIPPED BEYOND THE INFLUENCE OF OTHERS. THIS WAS TRAGIC ENOUGH IN UGANDA. IN LIBYA, THIS WOULD BE DISASTROUS SINCE LIBYA WITH ITS MONEY AND FANATICISM COULD SPREAD TERROR THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

3. KHALID SAID QUADDAFY HAS ONLY A SMALL CIRCLE OF SUPPORTERS IN LIBYA, A BASE SO NARROW THAT HE SHOULD NOT THINK HE CAN BE EMPEROR OF AFRICA OR THE ME. HE PERSONALLY IS AN UNPREDICTABLE NONENTITY.

4. IN RESPONSE TO YOUNG'S DISCUSSION OF THE BROAD US STRATEGY IN AFRICA, KHALID AND DENG NOTED THE POSITIVE RECEPTION THAT POLICY HAS RECEIVED AMONG AFRICANS. THEY OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE US HAS APPEARED VERY CAUTIOUS IN ITS NEW APPROACH TO AFRICA, PROBABLY BECAUSE THE AMERICANS ARE STILL NOT CERTAIN OF THEIR RECEPTION. THIS CAUTION POSES PROBLEMS FOR SOME AFRICANS: THE SOMALIS TELL KHALID THEY HAVE GOTTEN NOTHING BUT CAUTION FROM THE US IN RESPONSE TO SOMALI PROBES FOR SUPPORT--
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THEREFORE THE SUDAN SHOULD BE CAREFUL IN BANKING ON THE AMERICANS.

5. YOUNG SAID THE US HAS STRAIGHTFORWARD MONEY PROBLEMS IN MEETING ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AROUND THE WORLD, WHICH IS ONE BASIC EXPLANATION FOR OUR CAUTION. IN SOMALIA, HE HOPED THAT WHATEVER HAPPENED, THE US WOULD NOT MAKE THE SOVIETS THINK WE WERE TRYING TO DRIVE THEM OUT OF AFRICA. HE COMMENTED THAT IN THE ME, WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN GIVEN A ROLE IN GENEVA, THEY HAVE BECOME LESS OF A DISRUPTIVE FORCE. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD NOT DEVISE A TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT UNDERSTANDING IN AFRICA. IT MIGHT BE THOUGHT OF AS A VARIANT OF THE VARIOUS REGIONAL ZONE-OF-PEACE CONCEPTS. WITH THIS KIND OF UNDERSTANDING, FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD PROVIDE AID TO SOMALIA WITHOUT PUSHING OUT THE SOVIETS. WE MIGHT CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY ON EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, LEAVING A PRIMARY BUT NOT EXCLUSIVE ROLE FOR THE SOVIETS IN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA. UNDER THIS KIND OF NON-ALIGNMENT NOTION, THE TRADITIONAL

TENSIONS OF COMPETITION WOULD BE ALTERED, THE DILEMMAS EASED FOR AFRICAN STATES, AND SUPERPOWER INTERFERENCE IN THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL STATES HALTED. THE US COULD FEEL WELCOME IN SUCH RADICAL AREAS AS ANGOLA AND SOMALIA, WHERE OUR TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY WOULD COMPETE WELL ON THEIR OWN MERITS. THE BASIC QUESTION IS WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SUCH A NON-ALIGNMENT ENVIRONMENT. YOUNG SAID HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS CONCEPT FURTHER WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON.

6. KHALID SAID HE FEELS THE AFRICANS SHOULD NEVER TRY TO EXPEL THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE IN MOST NATIONAL SITUATIONS THE SOVIETS ARE NEEDED FOR BALANCE AGAINST WESTERN PRESENCE. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD EVER BE WILLING TO PLAY A "CONSTRUCTIVE" ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNMENT UNDERSTANDING OUTLINED BY CONFIDENTIAL

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AMBASSADOR YOUNG. THEY ALWAYS DRIVE TOWARD INFLUENCE, THEN CONTROL OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, INSISTING THAT DEVELOPMENT MUST END UP ON THEIR MODEL. AFRICANS, IN ANY EVENT, HAVE NO QUARREL WITH SOMALIA, ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHERS, IF THEY WISH TO USE MARXIST MODELS.

7. DENG SAID YOUNG WAS RIGHT: THE BIG PROBLEM IS A COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. HE SAID THEY HAVE AN IDEOLOGICAL INTOLERANCE THAT WILL BAR COOPERATION UNTIL THE POWER STRUGGLE IN A COUNTRY GOES COMPLETELY THEIR WAY. YOUNG COMMENTED THAT SOVIET INTOLERANCE IS MORE RACIAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL, A POINT ACKNOWLEDGED BY KHALID AND DENG. YOUNG SAID THE SOVIETS ARE ONLY COMFORTABLE WHEN THEY CAN ISSUE ORDERS TO AFRICANS. THEY ARE INSTINCTIVELY INTOLERANT OF INDEPENDENT THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS BY A STRONG, MODERN AFRICAN LEADER.

8. KHALID CONTRASTED THE SOVIETS' RIGIDITY WITH THE STYLE OF THE CHINESE. THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT HAS HAD DIFFICULTY IN GETTING TECHNICIANS AND AID SPECIALISTS TO GO TO THE SOUTH TO HELP IN DEVELOPMENT, BUT THE CHINESE CAME IN AND IMMEDIATELY TOOK ASSIGNMENTS IN THE FIELD THERE. CHINESE AID PEOPLE LIVE AMONG THE SUDANESE PEOPLE WITH NO SPECIAL FACILITIES OR PRIVILEGES AND THEREFORE WITH NO PROBLEMS AT ALL. THERE NOW ARE OVER 100 CHINESE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN.

9. DENG ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW AGGRESSIVE THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVEN TO BE IN ATTEMPTING TO MODIFY NATIONAL

SYSTEMS IN AFRICA. YOUNG RECALLED SOVIET FAILURES IN THE ME AND SAID HE EXPECTED THEIR BIGGEST FLOP TO COME IN ETHIOPIA. AFTER A WHIPPING IN ETHIOPIA, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT A NON-ALIGNMENT NOTION IN AFRICA. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THE

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SUPERPOWERS SHOULD RUN THE WORLD COOPERATIVELY, AND AS LONG AS WE HAVE ACCORDED THEM RESPECT AND HAVE SEEMED TO BE WORKING OFF THAT KIND OF PREMISE, THE SOVIETS HAVE APPEARED TO BEHAVE CONSTRUCTIVELY. THEY DO NOT CHANGE THEIR LONG-RANGE GOALS, HOWEVER.

10. YOUNG OBSERVED THAT THE FAMILIAR SOVIET APPROACH HAS BEEN GUIDED BY AN AGING LEADERSHIP THAT IS BOUND TO CHANGE. WITH YOUNGER, MORE MODERN MEN IN CONTROL IN MOSCOW, PERHAPS SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA WILL CHANGE. KHALID REMARKED ONLY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT SEEMED TO LEARN ANY LESSONS FROM THEIR BAD EXPERIENCE WITH GUINEA AND SEKOU TOURE. HE AGREED, THOUGH, THAT STRONG AND INDEPENDENT AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE SOVIET APPROACH COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON MOSCOW'S POLICY PERCEPTIONS. YOUNG ADDED THAT IT WAS HIS HOPE THAT THE OAU MEETING IN GABON IN LATE JUNE 1977 WOULD FURTHER DEFINE TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THAT SUCH A REDEFINITION WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN APPROACHING A CONCEPT OF A ZONE-OF-PEACE.

11. COMMENT: KHALID AND DENG ARE REMARKABLE LEADERS. THE RANGE OF CONVERSATION OVER SEVERAL EXTENDED OCCASIONS DURING OUR 36 HOURS IN KHARTOUM REVEALED THEIR EXTRA-ORDINARILY COSMOPOLITAN PREPARATION FOR THE DIFFICULT TASKS BEFORE THEM--THE BEST OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH EDUCATION, SUBSTANTIAL BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND YEARS OF DEALING AT SENIOR-MOST LEVELS WITH CRISES, NATIONAL PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. DENG IS A GRADUATE OF OXFORD AND COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL AND HAS A DOCTORATE OF LAW FROM YALE. KHALID'S TRAINING WAS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. BOTH OF THESE MEN, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, E.G., THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING HAS A PHD FROM CHICAGO, IN THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT, ARE IMPRESSIVE EXAMPLES OF THE BEST IN LEADERSHIP THAT AFRICA IS PRODUCING. IN THE SUDAN THE 1960'S POLICY OF

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EDUCATING AFRICANS IN US UNIVERSITIES HAS PAID HANDSOME

DIVIDENDS. SPIERS UNQUOTE VANCE

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